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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






AMRO A. ELANSARI, 




SHAY O. RAMIREZ; PAYPAL INC.; WEST GOSHEN POLICE; 
OFFICER RILEY (INDV. CAPACITY); LT CARROL (INDV. CAPACITY) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-06198) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on July 2, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 










Pro se appellant Amro Elansari appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). For the reasons discussed 
below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
In December 2019, Elansari filed a complaint against Shay Ramirez, the West Goshen 
Police Department, Police Officers Riley and Carroll, and PayPal, Inc. Elansari alleged that 
Ramirez, who lives in Oregon, agreed to collaborate with Elansari on the development of 
an internet-based video game. Elansari registered a website, provided Ramirez with access, 
and paid Ramirez to develop various aspects of the game. Elansari made payments to 
Ramirez and an associate through PayPal. Ramirez completed the project and asked Elan-
sari for more money. After Elansari refused to pay, Ramirez wiped the server containing 
the game files and replaced the content of the game’s website with curse words and other 
irrelevant content. Elansari reported Ramirez to the police in Oregon, who informed Elan-
sari that a report would need to be made through Pennsylvania authorities. Elansari then 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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contacted the West Goshen Police Department. Elansari was informed that no action would 
be taken because the case appeared to be a civil matter. 
Elansari’s complaint raised claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the West Goshen Po-
lice Department and its officers violated Elansari’s due process rights by failing to protect 
Elansari from Ramirez and failing to prosecute Ramirez. Elansari also brought claims 
against Ramirez and PayPal under Pennsylvania criminal statutes, see Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 7611 and 7612, which criminalize the unlawful use of a computer and attacking a com-
puter network to disrupt service. The District Court screened the complaint and dismissed 
it as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), concluding that there is no consti-
tutional right to the investigation or prosecution of another, and that the Pennsylvania crim-
inal statutes do not provide a basis for civil liability. This appeal ensued. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We construe Elansari’s pro se complaint 
liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and we will sum-
marily affirm the district court’s order if “no substantial question is presented” by the ap-
peal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4(a). “To be frivolous, a claim must rely on an ‘indisputably mer-
itless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” 
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 
319, 327–28 (1989)). 
The District Court properly determined that Elansari’s claims against the West Goshen 
Police Department and its officers are frivolous because “a private citizen lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Rich-
ard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). To the extent that Elansari claimed that the police 
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department and its officers failed to protect Elansari from Ramirez, the Due Process Clause 
generally does not impose upon the state an affirmative duty to protect its citizens from 
harms caused by private actors. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). And the “state-created danger” exception to that proposition 
does not apply here, as Elansari failed to allege any affirmative action by the defendants 
that rendered Elansari more vulnerable to the danger posed by Ramirez. See Bright v. 
Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that an essential ele-
ment of a state-created danger claim is that “a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all”); see also Morrow v. Balaski, 719 
F.3d 160, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to state a 
state-created danger claim because a school’s inaction and failure to protect a student did 
not constitute an “affirmative act”). 
We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the claims against PayPal and 
Ramirez are frivolous because Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 7611 and 7612 do not provide an express 
private right of action, and there is no basis to imply a private right of action here. See 
D’Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“To determine whether [a 
criminal] statute implies a private right of action, we must . . . determine 1) whether [the 
plaintiff is] among the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; 2) whether 
there is an indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
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or to deny it; and 3) whether such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of 
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy.”).1 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
1 The District Court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as amendment 
would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
